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Abstract  
This paper documents trends in social mobility in Norway starting from fathers 
born at the turn of the 20th century and ending with sons born in the 1970s. We 
measure social mobility with intergenerational income elasticities, associations 
between fathers’ and sons’ income percentiles, and brother correlations. All 
approaches suggest that social mobility increased substantially between cohorts 
born in the early 1930s and the early 1940s. Father-son associations remained 
stable for cohorts born after WWII, while brother correlations continued to 
decline. The relationship between fathers’ and sons’ income percentile ranks is 
highly nonlinear for the early cohorts, but approaches linearity over time. We 
discuss increasing educational attainment among low- and middle-income 
families as a possible mechanism behind these trends. 
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1 Introduction
The debate on the consequences of income inequality has drawn attention to the cross-
country differences in social mobility. A large body of research has shown that coun-
tries that are known for redistributive welfare state institutions and low cross-sectional
income inequality, such as the Nordic countries, have much lower degree of intergener-
ational income persistence than, for example, the United States or United Kingdom.1
These cross-country differences have led to speculation about their potential causes and
implications. Yet, it is difficult to draw conclusions from a pattern present in one point
in time. As a response, research has recently shifted towards a complementary approach
of documenting within-country changes in social mobility.
In this paper, we examine the evolution of social mobility in Norway for children
born between early 1930s and mid 1970s using newly digitalized data and alternative
measurement approaches. These birth cohorts are of particular interest because they
cover the period in which the Norwegian economy went through a dramatic structural
change and much of the Norwegian welfare state was built. The last cohorts included in
our data were born into one of the world’s richest countries with extensive redistributive
institutions and a high level of intergenerational mobility. In contrast, our earliest birth
cohorts grew up in a relatively poor and unequal country. We show that they also
experienced less social mobility than the later birth cohorts.
We contribute to the earlier literature in several dimension. We use high-quality reg-
ister data augmented with military records from the early 1950s and newly digitalized
municipal tax records from 1948. These data allow us to present precise estimates for
cohorts born before WWII. Moreover, we use three different measurement approaches—
intergenerational income elasticities, associations between father’s and son’s income per-
centile ranks, and brother correlations—in order to assess the robustness of the patterns
over time. We also examine the non-linearities in the father-son associations and, in
particular, document changes in these non-linearities across birth cohorts. Finally, we
document the changes in the association between educational attainment and family
background.
Our paper adds to the growing literature on the historical trends in intergenerational
mobility. Previous work examining Nordic countries include Pekkala and Lucas (2007)
1See Black and Devereux (2011) and Corak (2013) for recent surveys.
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who document trends in intergenerational income elasticity in Finland, and Björklund,
Jäntti, and Lindquist (2009) who examine the evolution of brother income correlations
in Sweden. Both of these papers present evidence on increasing mobility between co-
horts born in the 1930s and 1950s, and stable or decreasing social mobility for the later
birth cohorts. Modalsli (2015) documents a substantial increase in intergenerational
occupational mobility in Norway between 1865 and 2011. In contrast, Lindahl, Palme,
Sandgren Massih, and Sjögren (2015) focus on the descendants of one generation of school
children in one Swedish city and find no evidence of changes in intergenerational income
mobility. Clark (2012) examines the persistence of surnames among elite occupations
and argues that rates of social mobility in Sweden have remained roughly stable since
the pre-industrial era. Finally, and in line with our results, Bratberg, Nilsen, and Vaage
(2005) find that intergenerational income elasticities among the post-WWII cohorts in
Norway remained stable.2
Our main findings are as follows. All three approaches suggest that social mobility in-
creased between cohorts born in the early 1930s and the early 1940s. For the cohorts born
after WWII, our findings are more mixed with father-son income associations remaining
stable, while brother correlations continue to decline. A closer examination of the joint
father-son income percentile distribution reveals a fairly complex evolution. Downward
mobility among the sons of the highest earning fathers became more common over time,
while upward mobility from the 25th percentile of fathers’ income distribution steadily
increased. The prospects of sons of the lowest-earning fathers first improved and then
deteriorated. We find no changes for sons of fathers between the 50th and 75th percentiles
of the income distribution.
Guided by theoretical work starting with Becker and Tomes (1979) and extended,
among others, by Solon (2004), Hassler, Mora, and Zeira (2007), and Ichino, Karabar-
bounis, and Moretti (2011), we augment our analysis by documenting trends in returns
to education and in association between family background and educational attainment.
We show that among the cohorts for whom social mobility increased, educational attain-
2Studies examining trends in social mobility outside of the Nordic countries include Aaronson and
Mazumder (2008), Lee and Solon (2009), Chetty, Hendren, Kline, Saez, and Turner (2014), Olivetti,
Paserman, and Salisbury (2013), and Olivetti and Paserman (2015) for the United States; Blanden,
Goodman, Gregg, and Machin (2011) and Nicoletti and Ermisch (2008) for the United Kingdom; and
Lefranc and Trannoy (2005) for France. Long and Ferrie (2013) is a comparison of historical changes in
mobility in the U.S and U.K.
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ment increased rapidly among sons of fathers below the 80th percentile of father income
distribution. At the same time, returns to education decreased. This pattern is consistent
with a hypothesis that the major educational reforms initiated in the 1930s substantially
improved educational opportunities with the exception of the sons of the highest-earning
fathers (who were already being highly educated). The resulting increase in the supply
of educated workers may then have decreased returns to education. While our analysis is
purely descriptive, these stylized facts allow us to build a consistent narrative. We leave
a more rigorous testing of this narrative for future research.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we briefly
discuss the changes in the institutional context in Norway during our period of study.
The third section reviews the estimation methods used for assessing social mobility. In
the fourth section, we explain how we combine information from Norwegian censuses,
military records, tax register and municipality-level tax records to construct our data.We
present the main results on changes in intergenerational mobility over time in section 5
and discuss the role of education in section 6. The final section concludes.
2 Institutional context
In 1930, Norway was a poor and relatively unequal country in current standards with a
GDP per capita at around $4,000 in 2002 U.S. dollars, top one percent income share at
13% and a population with an average of seven years of education. On the other hand,
the standard of living in Norway was comparable to that of Sweden and the UK at the
time as measured by GDP per capita, average years of education, average height, life
expectancy and infant mortality.3
During the next few decades, Norway went through a dramatic transformation. The
economy industrialized rapidly and grew fast from mid-1930s onwards. During this
period—and particularly after WWII—Norway, like other Nordic countries, introduced
extensive welfare institutions that provide public services and insurance to everyone for
free or at a highly subsidized price. An important political shift took place in 1935,
when the Labour party came into power and started to extend old age pension, disability
pension, sickness leave, and unemployment benefits to cover the entire country and all
3The figures used in this section come from Grytten (2004, 2014), Aaberge and Atkinson (2010),
Statistics Norway (1995) and the "Clio Infra" website (https://www.clio-infra.eu/datasets/).
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industries.4
One of the first initiatives of the Labor Government was to reform the education sys-
tem with the aim of providing similar educational opportunities for all Norwegians. The
background of this reform was the large regional differences in the supply of education.
For example, the actual amount of teaching provided per year varied between 42 weeks
in cities to as low as 12 weeks in some rural municipalities. The reform was rolled out
over the next decade and led to a major increase in the public spending on education.
Another major educational reform took place in the 1960s when the mandatory education
was extended from seven to nine years. Furthermore, the high school sector and regional
college and university sector was expanded, particularly from the early 1970s onwards.
However, the transformation to a fully developed welfare state was not immediate, and
it partly relied on local initiatives by municipalities or private initiatives by philanthropic
societies. For example, school breakfast programs were initiated by some municipalities
from the mid 1930s onwards (Bütikofer, Mølland, & Salvanes, 2016). Another example is
the well-child visit centers for mothers and new born children, which were introduced by
a philanthropic society in the 1930s and taken over by the state only in the early 1970s
(Bütikofer, Løken, & Salvanes, 2016). Family polices like maternity leave and subsidized
day care were launched in the mid-1970s and implemented gradually (Carneiro, Løken,
& Salvanes, 2015). Furthermore, a fully developed social security system was introduced
in the mid 1960s.
In short, the cohorts born in the 1970s grew up in a very different country than those
born in the 1930s. By 1990, Norway had become one of the richest and equal countries
in the world with a GDP per capita over $20,000 in 2002 U.S. dollars and a top income
share of 4%. While 40% of the population still had only mandatory schooling, 15% had
a university degree.5
4Partial versions of these programs had been introduced earlier in some municipalities and occupa-
tions/industries. The implementation of these reforms was interrupted by the WWII and the German
invasion, but continued after the war.
5As we discuss in Section 6, the last birth cohort we examine—who were teenagers in 1990—ended
up having much higher educational attainment than the 1990 population.
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3 Measurement
Estimation of intergenerational mobility has a long history and the econometric and
measurement issues have been extensively discussed in numerous surveys.6 We examine
several measures of mobility—intergenerational income elasticity, rank-rank slopes, ex-
pected percentile ranks, and the sibling correlation of income—and focus on their changes
over time. These measures provide alternative and complementary perspectives on in-
tergenerational income persistence. In this section, we briefly discuss the estimation and
interpretation of each measurement approach.
3.1 Intergenerational Income Elasticity
The most common measure of social mobility is the intergenerational income elasticity,
which is typically measured by estimating the regression
lnYi = α + β lnXi + i (1)
where Yi is a measure of the sons’ income and Xi is a measure of his father’s income.
The intergenerational elasticity, β, can change over time for several reasons. First, it
can reflect changes in both the intergenerational correlation between fathers’ and sons’
income and changes in cross-sectional income inequality. To see this, note that
β =
σy
σx
ρ (2)
where ρ is the intergenerational income correlation and σy and σx are the standard devi-
ations of sons’ and fathers’ log income, respectively. Thus a decrease in β can follow from
both a decrease in intergenerational correlation or a decrease in cross-sectional income
inequality.
An important practical challenge in interpreting and estimating the intergenerational
income elasticity is that the association between fathers’ and sons’ log income tends to
be highly nonlinear (Bratsberg et al., 2007; Chetty, Hendren, Kline, & Saez, 2014). As a
consequence, the estimates for β can be highly sensitive to whether the tails of fathers’
income distribution are included in the estimations. In Figure A1 in the Appendix, we
6See for example Solon (1999), Björklund and Jäntti (2009), Black and Devereux (2011), and Jäntti
and Jenkins (2015).
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show that strong nonlinearities are present also in our data. Thus, changes in the tails
of fathers’ income distribution may have disproportionate influence on the changes in
β. In order to examine whether this issue affects our conclusions, we report estimates
below using our full data and a restricted sample, where we omit the top and the bottom
deciles of the fathers’ income distribution. We also investigate nonlinearities in detail in
the context of income percentile ranks.
3.2 Rank-rank Slope and Expected Percentile Ranks
Recent work on social mobility has shifted away from intergenerational income elastici-
ties and towards the association between fathers’ and sons’ income percentile ranks. This
approach has several advantages (Chetty, Hendren, Kline, & Saez, 2014). First, inter-
generational income elasticity estimates tend to suffer from important attenuation and
lifecycle biases, when one is forced to use snapshots of income data to construct proxies for
lifetime income (Haider & Solon, 2006; Böhlmark & Lindquist, 2006; Bhuller, Mogstad,
& Salvanes, in press). In contrast, Nybom and Stuhler (2014) show that estimates for
income percentile ranks are not sensitive to the age of measuring son’s income as long
as it is measured at their mid-30s to late-40s. Second, percentile ranks provide a natural
way to deal with zero incomes, which create an important measurement challenge when
measuring income in logarithms (Solon, 1992).
We start examining the association between fathers’ and sons’ income percentile ranks
by estimating the regression
Pi = α + βRi + i (3)
where Pi is son’s percentile rank in the income distribution of his birth cohort and Ri
is the percentile rank of his father. In regression (3), α corresponds to the expected
income percentile of a son of the poorest father and the "rank-rank slope" β measures
the difference in the expected percentile of the offspring of the poorest and the richest
fathers. Thus, β is a measure of relative income mobility.
An alternative approach is to examine the expected percentile rank of a son with a
father at the rth percentile. For example, Chetty, Hendren, Kline, and Saez (2014) use the
expected percentile rank of children whose parents are at the 25th percentile, αˆ+ .25βˆ, as
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a measure of "absolute upward mobility". We extend their approach in two ways. First,
we report the expected percentile rank of sons over the entire distribution of fathers’
income distribution and focus on the changes in these expected percentile ranks over time.
Second, we use local linear estimators to take into account that the association between
fathers’ and sons’ income percentile ranks is not linear in our data. This analysis allows
us to pin down where in fathers’ income distribution changes in mobility took place, and
whether the importance of particular parts of the parental income distribution changed
over time.
3.3 Brother Correlations
An alternative way to measure social mobility is to examine brother correlations instead
of father-son associations. An advantage of this approach is that one does not need to
observe parental income in order to calculate the correlation in income between brothers.
A conceptual advantage is that since brothers share the growth environment in a more
general sense, brother correlation can be interpreted as a broader measure of the im-
portance of childhood conditions than intergenerational associations. Thus, comparison
of trends in intergenerational associations and siblings correlations may be informative
about the changes in the importance of the factors that are shared by brothers—such as
school quality or changes in the importance of residential neighborhood—but not fully
captured by their fathers’ income.
We follow the estimation approach by Björklund et al. (2009) and regress the log
income of each brother i in family j at time t, Yijt, on year and age dummies Zijt
Yijt = γZijt + ijt (4)
The error term, ijt, is modeled to consist of the permanent family component shared by
all the brothers in a family, aj, the permanent component that is specific to individual,
bij, and an error term that picks up deviations from lifetime income, vijt, so that ijt =
aj + bij + vijt. The brother correlation, ρYi,Yk , is then
ρYi,Yj =
σ2a
σ2a + σ
2
b
(5)
In order to estimate the brother correlation, we need to estimate both variances σ2a and
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σ2b . Björklund et al. (2009) show that it is important to take into account the persistence
in the transitory term, vijt, in this estimation. We use their GMM approach under the
assumption that the transitory term follows an AR(1) process, i.e. vijt = λvijt−1 + uijt,
where uijt is a mean zero, constant variance random shock to current income.7
4 Data
Documenting social mobility imposes two requirements on data. First, we need reasonable
proxies of lifetime income for both parents and their children. This means that we need to
observe the income at an age when the association of annual income and lifetime income
is reasonably strong. In addition, we need to link family members together in order to
have information on individual’s own income as well as the income of their fathers and,
in part of the analysis, their brothers. These criteria determine our estimation sample
which contains information on individuals born between 1932 and 1974 and their fathers
and brothers. We also examine the cohort born in 1974–79 in our analysis for educational
attainment.
Our main data is derived from several longitudinal databases maintained by Statistics
Norway, which include information on demographic and socio-economic characteristics of
the entire Norwegian population. We augment these data with census data from 1960
and military records from early 1950s (see below for details). All data sources include
personal identifiers and thus allows us to link them together as well as to link children to
their parents and brothers. The information for family links come from the Norwegian
population register, which was established in the early 1960s using information collected
in the 1960 national and local censuses. For men born after 1950, we can identify virtually
all mothers (and thus brothers). For the earlier cohorts, we identify most fathers and
mothers until the cohorts born in the mid 1930s and more than a third for the cohorts
born in the early 1930s.
7 In order to make our results as comparable as possible with Björklund et al. (2009), we use the same
birth cohorts and focus on brothers born within seven calendar years of each other. We differ from their
specification in measuring income at age 35–44 (instead of 30–38) due to data restrictions. Furthermore,
we conduct inference using block bootstrap with brother pairs as the unit of resampling.
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4.1 Sons’ and Brothers’ income
Our measure for sons’ income comes from the tax register, which records annual (pre-tax)
income for years 1967–2010. Our income measure is the sum of labor income (from wages
and self-employment) and work-related cash transfers (such as unemployment benefits
and short-term sickness benefits). We measure income at age 35 for all birth cohorts,
because the oldest sons included in our analysis were born in 1932 (and are thus 35 years
old in 1967 when we first observe their income). This measure allows us to observe sons’
income for the cohorts born between 1932 and 1974. We also examine sons’ educational
attainment, which we measure using information from the education register.
Income at age 35 should provide us with a reasonable proxy for lifetime income
(Böhlmark & Lindquist, 2006; Bhuller et al., in press). By this age most men have
completed their education and have entered the labor market. In Tables A1 and A2 in
the Appendix, we show that the intergenerational income elasticity and the rank-rank
slope estimates are slightly larger when we measure son’s income at ages 30–34, 35–39
or 40–44 rather than at age 35. However, the differences are small and do not alter our
conclusions regarding the trend in social mobility. Virtually all sons are found from the
register, but seven and nine percent of them have zero income at the age of 35. We
include these observations in the analysis using percentile ranks, but omit them from the
log specifications for estimating intergenerational income elasticity.
4.2 Fathers’ income
We use two complementary approaches for measuring fathers’ income. First, we directly
observe fathers’ annual income from the tax register for those fathers, who are still of
working age in 1967 and for whom we can establish father-son links from the population
register. These conditions are fulfilled for virtually everyone in the later birth cohorts.
For earlier cohorts, however, we face the challenge that many of the fathers are at the end
of their work careers or already retired in 1967. Thus our primary measure of fathers’
income is his average income at age 55–64, when the sons are, on average, 29.6 years
old. Importantly, while measuring fathers’ income at a quite late age may lead to some
measurement error, the resulting attenuation bias is likely to be similar for all birth
cohorts.
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Despite measuring fathers’ income at a late age, the share of sons for whom we
directly observe father’s income declines as we move towards earlier birth cohorts. This
could distort our conclusions if the subpopulation for whom we observe fathers’ income
differs from the full population in terms of their intergenerational mobility. In order to
examine this possibility, we construct an alternative measure of father’s income using
military records. In Norway, military service is mandatory for all young men of normal
health. In the cohorts born between the 1930s and 1950s roughly 75% of men served in the
military (Rossow & Amundsen, 1986). Importantly, the military recorded information on
the occupation of the father for each conscript (but not father’s identification number).
We have access to the full draft records for men born in 1932–33. For other cohorts, we
observe fathers’ occupation from the 1960 census, provided that we observe the father-son
link from the population register.
We use the information on fathers’ occupation and son’s residence municipality to im-
pute income for the fathers. This imputation is based on Statistics Norway’s publication
(1950) that reports information on average salaries by occupation in 735 Norwegian mu-
nicipalities based on 1948 tax records. As the military records provide us with information
on the father’s occupation in twenty categories, we can use these pieces of information
to impute father’s income using over 10,000 income values from the tax records.8 These
sources allow us to construct imputed father income for almost 80% of men born in 1932–
33. The match is somewhat lower for the late 1930s and the 1940s cohorts, but increases
to 95% for the cohorts born in the early 1950s.
The strength of our two proxies for fathers’ lifetime income is that their limitations
are very different from each other. The tax register provides accurate information on
income, but these income measures come from late stages of the fathers’ careers.9 On
the other hand, the match of sons to fathers is not perfect for the early 1930s cohorts.
In contrast, the quality of the imputed income measure is likely to improve as we move
towards the earlier cohorts. The reason is that the imputation is based on the 1948 tax
records and thus occupation–municipality level averages are a better proxy for fathers’
8This is a major improvement on the earlier papers such as Pekkala and Lucas (2007) that have relied
on simple occupational averages to proxy for fathers’ incomes in the earliest cohorts.
9In the Appendix, we show that estimates using fathers’ income rank are not sensitive to the age at
which fathers’ income is measured (Table A1), but the intergenerational income elasticity estimates tend
to be substantially larger when fathers’ income is measured at a younger age (Table A2). Importantly,
these differences do not affect our conclusions regarding trends in social mobility.
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true income if the father was in his prime working age around 1948.
Table A3 in the Appendix presents a closer examination of the relationship between
the two measures by reporting estimates from regressing fathers’ observed income on his
imputed income among those fathers for whom we observe both measures. The results
show strong correlation among the cohorts born in the 1930s, slightly less correlation
among the 1940s birth cohorts and even less correlation among the 1950–54 birth cohort.
This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that measurement error in imputed income
becomes more severe as we move towards later birth cohorts. Consequently, we expect
attenuation bias to increase over time in analysis based on imputed income.
5 Results
This section presents our main results. We start with intergenerational rank-rank slopes,
and compare them to traditional intergenerational income elasticities as well as to the
brother correlations. The last subsection examines nonlinearities in the association be-
tween fathers’ and sons’ income percentile ranks.
5.1 Rank-rank Slope
Table 1 reports estimates from regressing sons’ percentile rank at age 35 in the income
distribution of his birth cohort on their fathers’ percentile rank in the fathers’ income
distribution (i.e. relative to other fathers with children in the same birth cohort). Each
estimate pair comes from a separate regression which differs in the birth cohort used in
the estimation (columns) and the way we approximate father’s lifetime income (panels).
In panel A, we use fathers’ average annual income at age 55–64. The results show that
the intergenerational rank correlation decreased from 0.28 in the cohort born in 1932–33
to 0.20 in the cohort born in 1940–44. This drop corresponds to an almost 30% decrease
in the rank-rank slope and is highly statistically significant. For the cohorts born after
the WWII, the intergenerational rank correlation remains remarkably stable. Panel B
reports similar estimates for a restricted sample, where we have excluded those in the
bottom and top deciles of father’s income distribution from the estimation sample. The
results are very similar to those obtained from the full sample.
Panel C of table 1 reports the estimates using imputed fathers’ income. For the
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1932–33 birth cohort, the sample size increases eightfold in comparison to that when
using fathers’ observed income. However, the estimate for the rank-rank slope is very
similar to those reported in panels A and B. Furthermore, we again find a clear decline
in intergenerational rank-rank slope between cohorts born in the early 1930s and early
1940s. In relative terms the drop, from 0.25 to 0.16, is larger than when using actual
income. After the cohort born in 1945, the rank-rank slopes continue to decline, but at a
much slower pace. These later declines are likely to reflect increasing attenuation bias as
the 1948 average occupation-municipality earnings become an increasingly worse proxy
for fathers’ true income (see section 4.2 for discussion).
5.2 Intergenerational Income Elasticity
Table 2 reports estimates for intergenerational income elasticity using identical approach
as for the rank-rank slopes above. In panel A, we use father’s actual income at age 55–64
to proxy for his lifetime income. Again, we observe a clear drop in the intergenerational
persistence between the cohorts born in the early 1930s and early 1940s after which
intergenerational income elasticity remains roughly constant.
Panel B of table 2 illustrates the importance of the tails of the father income distri-
bution for the estimation of intergenerational income elasticities. The estimates reported
in panel B come from otherwise identical regressions as those reported in panel A, but
we now omit observations from the top and bottom decile of fathers’ income distribution.
As a consequence, the estimated elasticities increase by 69–129%.
However, while the levels of the elasticity estimates are highly sensitive to including or
excluding the tails of fathers’ income distribution, the trends presented in panels A and B
are rather similar. Between the 1932–33 and 1940–44 birth cohorts, the elasticity drops
by 43% in the full sample and by 33% in the restricted sample, and remains roughly
constant afterwards with the exception of the elasticity rising slightly in the trimmed
sample between cohorts born in the late 1940s and late 1950s, and then declining back
to the late 1940s level.
Panel C of table 2 confirms the same patterns when using father’s imputed income to
proxy for his lifetime income. The estimates are very similar to those using the trimmed
sample of father’s observed income. The elasticity estimates decline by 32% between
birth cohorts born in the early 1930s and early 1940s, and remain roughly stable for the
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remaining birth cohorts.
5.3 Brother Correlations
Since the measurement of father’s lifetime income is somewhat incomplete in the in-
tergenerational regressions reported above, it is useful to compare our intergenerational
results to the estimates of brother income correlations. In table 3 we report estimates
for the components of the income variance together with estimates for autocorrelation in
the transitory shock and the overall brother correlation. The main estimates concern the
family component σ2a and the individual component σ2b . In order to ease comparisons, we
have replicated the cohort and income definitions of Björklund et al. (2009) as closely as
possible (see footnote 7).
The second and third columns of table 3 report a clear declining trend in the family
component which falls by a third between cohorts born in the 1930s and the 1940s. As
a consequence, brother correlation in income decreases, which provides further evidence
on the decreasing importance of family background. The estimated levels and trends of
brother correlations during this period are very similar to those reported by Björklund
et al. (2009) for Sweden, suggesting that similar mechanisms are likely to be behind the
changes in social mobility in Sweden and Norway.
Interestingly, the brother correlation in income continues to decline also among the
cohorts for whom father-son rank correlations and intergenerational income elasticities
remain stable. These diverging patterns suggest that the importance of the factors shared
by brothers, but not related to fathers’ income, continued to lose their importance. This
could be due to, for example, a decrease in residential income segregation, the quality of
education becoming more similar across schools, or other factors related to social class
not picked up by the fathers’ income. However, a full examination of these potential
mechanisms is beyond the scope of this study.
Figure 1 summarizes our results thus far by plotting together the rank-rank slopes,
intergenerational elasticities and brother correlations from our preferred specifications. It
illustrates that while the alternative specifications give different levels of the persistence
estimates, all estimation approaches suggest that social mobility increased between cohort
born in the early 1930s and early 1940s. For the cohorts born after WWII, father-
son associations remain stable, while the brother correlations continue to decline. The
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stability of father-son associations for cohorts born after WWII is in line with earlier
results for the US (Aaronson & Mazumder, 2008; Lee & Solon, 2009; Chetty, Hendren,
Kline, Saez, & Turner, 2014) and for Norway (Bratberg et al., 2005). For the pre-WWII
birth cohorts, brother correlations are similar to earlier results for Sweden (see above).
However, the continuing decline of brother correlations in Norway among the post-WWII
birth cohorts differs from the results of Björklund et al. (2009), who find a slight increase
in brother correlations in Sweden starting from the cohort born in the mid-1950s.
5.4 Trends Across the Parental Income Distribution
The estimates discussed above are consistent with various patterns of mobility. For
example, the drop in income persistence between the cohorts born in the early 1930s
and 1940s could be driven by increases in the upward mobility of the sons from low-
or middle income families or, alternatively, by increased downward mobility from the
top of the fathers’ income distribution. A shortcoming of the summary measures of
mobility that Chetty, Hendren, Kline, and Saez (2014) classify as "measures of relative
mobility" is that they do not distinguish between these possibilities. Thus, next we focus
on estimating absolute mobility measures over fathers’ income distribution.
In order to assess in which part of the income the changes in mobility took place,
Figure 2 present the results for four birth cohorts by plotting the expected sons’ income
percentile against his fathers’ income percentile.10 We follow Chetty, Hendren, Kline,
and Saez (2014) and divide the horizontal axis into 100 percentile bins and plot the mean
son income percentile for each bin. The figure also includes a linear fit corresponding to
the rank-rank slope estimates reported in table 1 and local linear estimates for the sons’
expected income rank over the income distribution of fathers. Table 4 reports the local
linear estimates for some fathers’ income percentiles for all birth cohorts included in our
data.
Figure 2 and Table 4 present a complex picture of the evolution of the joint father-son
income percentile distribution. The association between fathers’ and sons’ income per-
centile ranks is highly nonlinear among the early cohorts, but approaches linearity over
time. Nevertheless, changes in the rank-rank slope estimates (Table 1), and a comparison
10The corresponding figures for the remaining birth cohorts, and for using fathers’ imputed income,
are presented in Figures A2 and A3 in the Appendix. We also report transition matrices for fathers’ and
sons’ income quintiles in Table A7.
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of the predicted percentile ranks at the bottom and and the top of father’s income distri-
bution (Table 4), lead to similar conclusions: both suggest that the difference in average
income ranks between sons coming from the top and the bottom of fathers’ income dis-
tribution has dropped from roughly 30 to roughly 20 percentiles. On the other hand, the
expected income percentiles remain remarkably stable for sons whose fathers are between
the 50th and the 75th percentile, while the expected income rank for sons of fathers at
the 25th percentile steadily increases over time. Furthermore, upward mobility from the
bottom of father’s income distribution increases among cohorts born before early 1940s
and then declines from the late 1950s birth cohort onwards. Finally, and most notably,
the average income percentile of sons of the highest-income fathers, declines steadily over
time. For example, the expected percentile rank of sons of the fathers at the 95th per-
centile, declines from 67th for those born in the early 1930s into 60th for those born in
the early 1970s.
In order to place our results into a context, we compare them to contemporary United
States.11 The expected income percentile of Norwegian men born in the 1932–33 cohorts
to the fathers at the 95th income percentile, is very close to the expected percentile
of Americans born in 1980–82 in families at the 95th percentile of the parental income
distribution (67th in Norway vs. 66th in the US). On the other hand, the expected income
percentile of Norwegians born in the 1930s to fathers at the 5th percentile, is already
much higher than that in the contemporary United States (41st in Norway vs. 34th in
the United States). It is also informative to contrast the changes over time in Norway to
geographical variation in the contemporary U.S. According to the preferred measure used
by Chetty, Hendren, Kline, and Saez (2014)–the expected income percentile of children
growing up in families at the 25th percentile–Norwegian men born in 1932–33 experienced
absolute upward mobility comparable to the mid-ranking locations in the current United
States such as Denver or Buffalo. In contrast, the absolute upward mobility for Norwegian
cohorts born in 1970–74 is comparable to the most mobile locations in the U.S. such as
Salt Lake City or Pittsburgh.
11The information for the United States is from the Appendix to Chetty, Hendren, Kline, and Saez
(2014). It is important to keep in mind that our measures refer to the personal income of the sons and
their fathers, while Chetty, Hendren, Kline, and Saez (2014) measure income at the family level.
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6 Education as a Potential Mechanism
While several alternative mechanisms may give rise to changes in social mobility, much
of the discussion has focused on the role of human capital and changes in the production
technology. Theoretical work such as Becker and Tomes (1979), Solon (2004), Hassler
et al. (2007), and Ichino et al. (2011) has shown that educational policies that decrease
the cost of education for the offspring of disadvantaged families tend to increase social
mobility.12 On the other hand, changes in production technology that increase returns to
skill may create incentives for the poor families to invest in education, and lead to higher
mobility. In this section, we present a set of stylized facts that examine these potential
mechanisms. However, we stress that our analysis is purely descriptive and thus does not
provide strong evidence on the causal impacts of educational reforms or changes in the
production process.
6.1 Education and Income
Table 5 summarizes the trends in educational attainment in Norway over our observation
period. Average years of education increased by 2.7 years or 27% between the cohorts born
in the early 1930s and late the 1970s. These changes are partly due to the educational
reforms discussed in section 2 that made attendance in secondary education universal. In
addition, the share of the birth cohorts obtaining a college degree increased dramatically
in parallel with the expansion of the college and university sector.
The next two columns of Table 5 present estimates from regressing log income at
age 35 on years of education (column 3) or an indicator for having a college degree
(column 4).13 Between the cohorts born in the early 1930s and the late 1940s, the
association between log income and years of education decreases by 18% and returns to a
college degree by 31%. This change is consistent with the hypothesis that the increased
supply of educated workers decreased returns to education. However, among cohorts
born after 1950, returns to education increased substantially even though the supply
of educated workers continued to increase. This pattern is consistent with demand for
12See Björklund and Salvanes (2011) for an overview of empirical research on education and family
background.
13In Figure A4 in the Appendix we show that the relationship between income and years of educa-
tion is roughly linear and thus single regression coefficients provide a meaningful summarization of this
association.
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educated workers increasing faster than the supply (see e.g. Goldin and Katz (2009) for
discussion).14
6.2 Education and Parental Background
We now turn to changes in the relationship between educational attainment and family
background. Figure 3 and Table A12 present the results for years of education using an
identical approach as used in section 5.4 for income percentile ranks. That is, we use local
linear regressions to estimate the expected years of education across the fathers’ income
percentile.
Figure 3 reveals a highly convex relationship between parental background and years
of education, particularly among the early birth cohorts. For the cohorts born between
the 1930s and the 1950s, the relationship is very steep above the 80th percentile rank and
fairly flat below that. For the later birth cohorts, the relationship slowly becomes more
linear as the sons of the low- and middle-income fathers steadily increase their educational
attainment, while the education of sons of the high-income fathers remains remarkably
stable. As a consequence, the gap between the expected years of education of sons born
to the fathers at the 95th and 5th percentiles decreases from three to two years between
cohorts born in the late 1930s and early 1970s (table A12).15
Figure 4 and Table 7 repeat the analysis for the likelihood of the son obtaining a
college degree. The pattern is qualitatively similar as for years of education, but more
pronounced across fathers’ income distribution. About a tenth of the sons born in the
1930s into families below the 70th percentile in fathers’ income distribution, had a college
degree, while almost 70% of the sons of the highest income families did. Above the 80th
percentile, the association between fathers’ income rank and sons’ likelihood of getting a
college degree was very steep. The strong association at the top of the distribution remains
14For brevity, we refer to the association between income and educational attainment as "returns to
education". We recognize that this association may not measure a causal relationship, because unob-
served factors are likely to affect educational choices. Furthermore, the nature of the selection process
may change over time.
15For completeness, columns 5–6 of Table 5 report estimates from regressing sons’ years of education
on fathers’ observed income percentile. These estimates, and those reported in the first column of Table
A12, indicate that men born in 1932–33 for whom we observe fathers’ income in the tax register, have
low educational attainment. The most likely explanation is that for this cohort, we can observe fathers
at age 55–64 in 1967 only if the father was quite young when the son was born. In the Appendix, we
show that the expected years of education evolve smoothly over the early birth cohorts when we replicate
Table A12 using fathers’ imputed income.
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over time, even though the pattern otherwise becomes more linear as the likelihood to
obtain a college degree increases amon the sons of low-income, and particularly, middle-
income fathers.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have documented trends in social mobility among Norwegian men dur-
ing the period when Norway transformed from a poor and unequal country into one of
the world’s richest economies with extensive redistributive institutions. According to all
of our measurement approaches, social mobility increased between cohorts born in the
early 1930s and the early 1940s. The increase in mobility coincides with an equalization
in educational attainment across fathers’ income distribution and declining association
between income and education. These patterns are consistent with a hypothesis that the
expansion of public provision of education simultaneously leveled educational opportuni-
ties and a reduced returns to education. However, it is important to keep in mind that
these results are purely descriptive. Thus examining the causal impact of educational
reforms affecting these birth cohorts may be a particularly promising avenue for future
research.
The results for the post-WWII birth cohorts are more mixed. Father-son income
correlations remained stable between cohorts born in the late 1940s and the early 1970s,
while brother correlations and the expected income rank of the sons of the highest and
lowest earning fathers declined. At the same time, returns to education increased and
the educational attainment of children coming from low- and middle-income families
grew rapidly. These patterns are consistent with a hypothesis that increasing returns
to education would tend to reduce social mobility, while the continuing equalization of
educational attainment would push towards more mobility. A possible interpretation is
that these forces largely offset each other during this period. We stress again, that while
the stylized facts are consistent with such an interpretation, there remains much scope
for future research that would put these hypotheses into a more rigorous test.
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Figure 1: Trends in social mobility
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Intergenerational
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Note: This figure presents the point estimates for rank-rank slopes from regressing son’s income percentile on
father’s income percentile, intergenerational income elasticities from regressing son’s log income on father’s log
income, and brother income correlations estimated using the GMM approach of Björklund et al. (2009). Each
estimate comes from a separate regression. In the intergenerational regressions, son’s income is measured at
age 35 and father’s income at age 55–64 using pre-tax annual income. Intergenerational income elasticities are
estimated using a sample that omits the top and bottom decile of fathers’ income distribution. For brother
correlations, we use pre-tax annual income at age 35–44 and include only brothers born within seven calendar
years of each other.
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Table 3: Brother correlations
Variance component Auto- Sibling
Family Individual Error correlation correlation
Birth cohort: σ2a σ2b σ2v λ ρ
1932–1938 0.070 0.081 0.126 0.583 0.463
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.032) (0.024)
1935–1941 0.059 0.078 0.121 0.547 0.430
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.027) (0.024)
1938–1944 0.050 0.076 0.122 0.567 0.397
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.026) (0.024)
1941–1947 0.044 0.073 0.131 0.635 0.378
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.026) (0.025)
1944–1950 0.049 0.078 0.137 0.637 0.383
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.029) (0.029)
1947–1953 0.053 0.090 0.154 0.637 0.370
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.033) (0.033)
1950–1956 0.052 0.096 0.166 0.669 0.350
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.031) (0.029)
1953–1959 0.054 0.106 0.168 0.650 0.337
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.036) (0.032)
1956–1962 0.054 0.114 0.163 0.652 0.322
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.034) (0.028)
1959–1965 0.054 0.122 0.154 0.648 0.306
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.037) (0.027)
1962–1968 0.056 0.122 0.146 0.646 0.315
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.024) (0.017)
Note: Point estimates and block bootstrapped standard errors (in parentheses) using 1,000
replications. See Section 4 for discussion.
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Table 4: Son’s expected income percentile by father’s income percentile
Birth cohort
Father’s 1932 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
percentile: –33 –39 –44 –49 –54 –59 –64 –69 –74
95th 0.672 0.676 0.647 0.634 0.629 0.626 0.621 0.610 0.603
(0.013) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
90th 0.629 0.627 0.600 0.594 0.590 0.592 0.591 0.584 0.577
(0.010) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
75th 0.549 0.540 0.532 0.531 0.534 0.536 0.539 0.539 0.537
(0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
50th 0.490 0.488 0.482 0.486 0.485 0.488 0.489 0.492 0.500
(0.010) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
25th 0.415 0.433 0.447 0.445 0.451 0.452 0.451 0.457 0.461
(0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
10th 0.407 0.416 0.434 0.434 0.433 0.429 0.431 0.424 0.419
(0.010) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
5th 0.413 0.416 0.441 0.443 0.443 0.436 0.431 0.419 0.404
(0.013) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Note: Local linear estimates and standard errors (in parentheses). The estimates come from local linear regression
using edge (triangle) kernel and Stata’s rule-of-thumb bandwidth selection routine where we regress sons’ income
percentile at age 35 on his father’s income percentile at age 55–64. The estimates for each column come from a
separate regression.
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Table 5: Trends in educational attainment
Assocation between log Assocation between
income at 35 and father’s income rank and
Years of Tertiary Years of Tertiary Years of education Tertiary degree
education degree education degree Cons. Slope Cons. Slope
1932-33 10.0 0.13 0.062 0.41 8.4 2.3 0.00 0.18
1935-39 10.5 0.17 0.065 0.41 9.0 3.2 0.01 0.35
1940-44 11.1 0.22 0.052 0.30 9.7 3.1 0.06 0.36
1945-49 11.4 0.24 0.051 0.28 10.1 2.9 0.08 0.36
1950-54 11.8 0.27 0.060 0.29 10.5 2.7 0.09 0.36
1955-59 12.0 0.26 0.075 0.35 10.8 2.4 0.09 0.34
1960-64 12.0 0.26 0.074 0.31 10.9 2.2 0.09 0.35
1965-69 12.3 0.29 0.073 0.31 11.2 2.2 0.12 0.35
1970-74 12.6 0.34 0.074 0.29 11.6 2.1 0.16 0.35
1975-79 12.6 0.36 0.080 0.31 11.7 2.0 0.19 0.37
Note: Columns 1-2 report average years of education and the share obtaining a tertiary degree for each birth cohort.
Column 3 reports OLS point estimates from regressing log annual income at age 35 on years of education. Column
4 reports similar estimates when using an indicator variable for tertiary degree as a measure of education. Columns
5–6 report the estimates from regressing son’s years of education on father’s income rank. Columns 7–8 report similar
estimates for son’s tertiary degree.
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Table 6: Son’s expected years of education by father’s income percentile
Birth cohort
Father’s 1932 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
percentile: –33 –39 –44 –49 –54 –59 –64 –69 –74 –79
95th 11.7 13.6 13.9 13.9 14.0 13.8 13.5 13.6 13.8 13.8
(0.16) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
90th 10.6 12.5 12.9 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.2 13.3 13.5 13.5
(0.12) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
75th 9.8 10.8 11.4 11.7 12.0 12.2 12.4 12.8 13.1 13.2
(0.11) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
50th 9.4 10.3 11.0 11.2 11.6 11.8 11.9 12.2 12.6 12.7
(0.11) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
25th 9.0 9.9 10.6 10.9 11.3 11.5 11.6 11.8 12.2 12.3
(0.11) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
10th 8.8 9.7 10.2 10.6 10.9 11.1 11.2 11.5 11.7 11.8
(0.10) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
5th 8.9 9.6 10.2 10.5 11.0 11.2 11.3 11.5 11.8 11.7
(0.12) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Note: Local linear estimates and standard errors (in parentheses). The estimates come from local linear
regression using edge (triangle) kernel and Stata’s rule-of-thumb bandwidth selection routine where we regress
sons’ years of education on his father’s income percentile at age 55–64. The estimates for each column come
from a separate regression.
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Table 7: Son’s likelihood of obtaining a tertiary degree by father’s income percentile
Birth cohort
Father’s 1932 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
percentile: –33 –39 –44 –49 –54 –59 –64 –69 –74 –79
95th 0.31 0.54 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.55 0.59
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
90th 0.16 0.39 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.53
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
75th 0.08 0.19 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.36 0.40 0.46
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
50th 0.08 0.14 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.26 0.32 0.35
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
25th 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.26 0.30
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
10th 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.23
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
5th 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.22 0.22
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Local linear estimates and standard errors (in parentheses). The estimates come from local linear re-
gression using edge (triangle) kernel and Stata’s rule-of-thumb bandwidth selection routine where we regress an
indicator for the son holding a tertiary degree on his father’s income percentile at age 55–64. The estimates for
each column come from a separate regression.
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A1 Appendix
Tables A1 and A2: Age at measuring income
Tables A8 and A9 report estimates for rank-rank slopes and intergenerational income elasticities
when measuring fathers’ and sons’ earnings at different ages. For reference, the first row of panels
A shows the estimates reported in the main paper, while the remaining rows report estimates
corresponding to different ages for measuring son’s earnings. Since our earnings data start in
1967 and ends in 2010, we do not observe sons’ earnings before age 35 for the early cohorts nor
earnings after age 35 for the late cohorts. Panels B reports similar estimates, but now measuring
fathers’ earnings at age 45–54. Using age 45–54 earnings does not allow us to measure rank-
rank-correlations for the cohorts born before 1945. The estimates for rank-rank slopes are quite
insensitive to the age at which son’s or father’s income is measured. Measuring son’s income over
longer periods yields somewhat somewhat larger estimates than when using a single year, while
measuring fathers’ income at age 45–54 tends to yield slightly smaller estimates than when using
income at age 55–64. However, all these differences are quite small and, most importantly, all
measures show similar trends. The estimates for intergenerational income elasticity are, again,
not largely affected by the time when we measure son’s income. However, elasticity estimates
using fathers’ income at age 44–54 are 64–94% larger than estimates
Table A3: Imputation vs. observed father’s income
In order to examine the quality of the imputed income measures, we compare fathers’ observed
and imputed income among those individuals for whom our data contain both measures. Table
A10 reports results from regressions:
Pi,obs = α + βPi,imp + i (A6)
where Pi,obs is the observed father’s income rank (from the tax register) at age 55-64 for individual
i, Pi,imp is the imputed father’s income rank, and i is an error term.
The first column examines sons born between 1932–33. For this cohort, we can use the
military records to construct imputed father’s income rank for 33,100 individuals, while the
actual father’s income rank at age 55–64 is observed only for 4,086 individuals. Both measures
are available for 4,008 men. They are highly correlated, but by no means identical. The R-
squared from regressing father’s observed income on his imputed income is 0.14. This relatively
low R-squared reflects both measurement error inherent in our imputations and changes in the
true income rank of the father’s between early 1950s and the time when they were 55–64 years
35
old. The remaining columns report similar analysis for the later cohorts. The point estimate and
R-squared are largest among the 1935–39 birth cohort and smallest among the 1950–54 birth
cohort. This pattern is consistent with an increasing measurement error over birth cohorts.
Tables A4–A6: Son’s expected outcomes by father’s imputed income
Tables A11 and A12 replicate tables 5 and 8 of the main paper using father’s imputed income
(instead of father’s observed income at age 55–64).
Table A7: Transition matrices
Table A14 presents quintile transition matrices for four birth cohots. Each entry in a matrix
corresponds to the probability that a son of father in a given quintile (columns) ends up in a
quintile in the son income distribution (rows). For instance, 39.7% of sons growing up in the
top quintile in the 1935–39 birth cohort were themselves in the top quintile at age 35.
A2 Figures
Figures A1-A3: Shape of the father-son income associations
Figure A5 shows the relationship between father’s and son’s log income. It is constructed by
dividing father’s log income (x-axis) into 100 percentile bins and plotting the mean son log income
for each bin (y-axis). The figure also includes a linear fit corresponding to intergenerational
income elasticity estimates reported in table 4 of the main paper.
Figure A6 reports the association between son’s and father’s income ranks for all birth cohorts
in our data using the procedure described in section 5.3 of the main paper. Figure A7 shows
the corresponding analysis when using father’s imputed income.
Figure A4: Log income on years of education
In table 5 of the main paper, we report estimates from regressing income at 35 on years of edu-
cation. Figure A8 shows that these regression coefficients provide a reasonable characterisation
of the relationship between income and education, i.e. that the relationship is approximately
linear. Figure A8 also plots the distribution of years of education for the birth cohorts included
in our data.
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Table A10: Associations between fathers’ observed and imputed income
Son’s birth cohort
1932–33 1935–39 1940–44 1945–49 1950–54
A: Earnings rank
Father’s imputed 0.38 0.44 0.37 0.30 0.25
earnings rank (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.31 0.26 0.31 0.35 0.38
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R2 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.09 0.06
Observations 3,855 30,529 74,843 126,225 138,614
B: Log earnings
Father’s imputed 0.55 0.63 0.56 0.51 0.45
log earnings (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 5.40 4.59 5.48 6.13 6.75
(0.34) (0.13) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
R2 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.04
Observations 3,736 29,922 72,790 120,649 129,106
Note: Estimates and robust standard errors (in paratheses) from regressing father’s observed
income on his imputed rank. In panel A, the outcome variable is father’s observed income
rank at age 55–64 and the dependent variable is father’s imputed income rank. In panel B,
the outcome variable is father’s observed log earnings at age 55–64 and the dependent variable
is father’s imputed income rank.
Table A11: Son’s expected income percentile by father’s imputed income percentile
Son’s expected percentile by birth cohort
Father’s 1932 1935 1940 1945 1950
percentile: –33 –39 –44 –49 –54
95th 0.643 0.605 0.590 0.577 0.569
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
90th 0.614 0.581 0.565 0.554 0.544
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
75th 0.563 0.550 0.548 0.532 0.529
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
50th 0.488 0.478 0.505 0.506 0.501
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
25th 0.442 0.432 0.466 0.471 0.476
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
10th 0.414 0.414 0.434 0.434 0.435
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
5th 0.401 0.417 0.436 0.436 0.436
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
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Table A12: Son’s expected years of education by father’s imputed income percentile
Son’s expected percentile by birth cohort
Father’s 1932 1935 1940 1945 1950
percentile: –33 –39 –44 –49 –54
95th 12.0 12.3 12.7 12.9 13.1
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
90th 11.0 11.4 11.7 11.8 12.1
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
75th 10.7 11.3 11.7 11.7 12.0
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
50th 9.7 10.4 11.0 11.3 11.7
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
25th 9.3 9.9 10.6 11.1 11.6
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
10th 9.1 9.7 10.3 10.8 11.3
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
5th 9.0 9.7 10.3 10.7 11.1
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Table A13: Son’s expected college degree by father’s imputed income percentile
Son’s expected percentile by birth cohort
Father’s 1932 1935 1940 1945 1950
percentile: –33 –39 –44 –49 –54
95th 0.34 0.37 0.42 0.43 0.46
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
90th 0.21 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.32
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
75th 0.20 0.26 0.30 0.29 0.29
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
50th 0.12 0.16 0.21 0.25 0.25
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
25th 0.09 0.11 0.17 0.20 0.23
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
10th 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.19
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
5th 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.18
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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